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INTRODUCTION

Public displays of the Ten Commandments have been touchstones
of Establishment Clause litigation ever since the Supreme Court ordered a public school to remove a plaque in 1980.1 In response, attorneys, academics, and judges, viewing themselves as defenders of
religious expression, have put forward arguments purporting to explain why the courts should allow such displays. The arguments have
1. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

1

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 14 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 11

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

generally centered on the historical importance of the Decalogue in
either the development of law or American society. The point of the
historical argument is to paint the Commandments as neutral documents, displayed with a valid secular purpose. If this is established,
the display is constitutional under the Court's precedent and will be
allowed to stand.2 The success of the historical argument in the courts
has been extremely (some would say notoriously) fact dependent, as
the Supreme Court demonstrated in its divided (and divisive) 2005
decisions, McCreary County v. ACL U and Van Orden v. Perry.3
Opponents of Decalogue displays argue that the religious interests
that want to see the Commandments displayed are being disingenuous
in their legal arguments, disserving the very interests of religious expression they claim to defend. Specifically, the opponents suggest that
reducing the Ten Commandments to historical artifacts practically extinguishes the meaning of the religious text. Justice Stevens made this
point clearly in his Van Orden dissent:
The message at issue ... is fundamentally different from either a
bland admonition to observe generally accepted rules of behavior or
a general history lesson. The reason this message stands apart is
that the Decalogue is a venerable religious text .... Attempts to
secularize what is unquestionably a sacred text defy credibility and
disserve people of faith.4
Such criticisms5 have gone largely unheeded by the Decalogue defenders, who generally are much more a part of mainstream evangelical Christianity than critics like Justice Stevens. But recently, in the
well-publicized case Glassroth v. Moore,6 a religious-liberty team defending a display of the Commandments specifically voiced the same
concerns as Justice Stevens when deciding on their litigation strategy.7
Moore's approach caused divisions in the religious liberty community,
even before the case took a turn for the sensational when Moore refused to remove the monument.
This Comment's objective is not primarily to say why the Commandments are desirable to display, nor to frame a detailed legal case
2. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860, 875-76 (2005) (neutrality is "the touchstone" of Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
3. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
4. Id. at 716-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
5. Another incisive statement of the issue was made by Professor Laycock in
1981: "Those who take religion seriously have reason to be alarmed when public officials proclaim that crosses and Christmas carols have no religious significance, or that
the Ten Commandments are a secular code." Douglas Laycock, Towards a General
Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to
Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1384 (1981).

6. Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (M.D. Ala. 2002), affd, 335 F.3d
1282 (11th Cir. 2003).
7. See Roy S. MOORE WITH JOHN PERRY, So HELP ME GOD: THE TEN COMMANDMENTS,

JUDICIAL TYRANNY,

AND

THE BATTLE FOR RELIGIOUS

179-80 (2005).
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol14/iss2/11
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as to how they can be defended. The inquiry is limited to the interplay of theology and law in the historical argument for the Commandments-are public displays of the Commandments trapped between
theological indifference on the one hand, or legal failure on the other?
With the modest belief that the legal practitioners should take note of
the theological implications of their arguments,8 and that the arguments should be informed by both the principle and the practical, we
shall proceed: first, to examine the state of the court precedent; second, to consider the theological problems with the "historical" defense of the Commandments; and third, to suggest some routes which
would avoid the theological problem.
II.

THE MONUMENT OR THE MESSAGE

Titters of amusement were heard across the political landscape
when the Court handed down two Ten Commandments decisions on
the last day of its 2005-2006 term, one upholding and one striking
down as unconstitutional the respective displays.9 Whatever the public's perception of schizophrenia on the high court, the majority and
plurality opinions were in harmony on at least one component of their
analysis: both evaluated the historical nature of the monuments. 10
They just happened to take differing perspectives on details of the
history.
A.

McCreary: Religion over History

At issue in McCreary were displays on the "Foundations of Law" in
two county courthouses in Kentucky, each featuring a framed copy of
the Ten Commandments. 1 The majority opinion centered on whether
the monument violated the "secular legislative purpose"1 2 test from
Lemon v. Kurtzman. 3 Basic to the inquiry was the historical nature
of the Ten Commandments, for it was on this ground that the counties
defended the displays.
The counties' "Foundations" displays at first featured a framed copy
of an abbreviated King James Version of the Ten Commandments.
After the suit was filed against the counties, the display was modified4
twice, each time adding more historical documents into the mix.'
8. See generally David A. Skeel, The Unbearable Lightness of Christian Legal
Scholarship, 57 EMORY L.J. 1471 (2008) (reviewing the history of Christian legal
scholarship).
9. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Allow a Commandment Display, Bar Others:
Context is Cited in the Divided Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2005, at Al, A17.
10. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683, 687, 689-90; id. at 692 (Scalia, J.
concurring); id. at 692 (Thomas, J. concurring); id. at 701 (Breyer, J. concurring in
judgment).
11. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 856 (2005).
12. Id. at 859 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
13. Id. at 867-74.
14. Id. at 851-57.
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Obviously the counties' behavior looked very much like the creation
of a sham secular purpose-a bad start from any perspective, and a
significant factor for the Court in evaluating the counties' "historical,
ergo secular, ergo constitutional" argument.
The tone was set by the Circuit decision, which the Supreme Court
affirmed:
The Circuit majority stressed that . .. displaying the Commandments bespeaks a religious object unless they are integrated with
other material so as to carry a 'secular message.' The majority
judges saw no integration here because of a 'lack of a demonstrated
analytical or historical connection
[between the Commandments
15
and] the other documents.
When the Court proceeded to its own analysis, it likewise found the
historical documents to be insufficient to eradicate the "unmistakable" religious object of the exhibit. 6
The Court considered the three versions of the display in order.
The first display, with the Decalogue appearing "solo,"' 7 was hardly
taken seriously as historical: "This is not to deny that the Commandments have had influence on civil or secular law .... The point is
simply that the original text viewed in its entirety is an unmistakably
religious statement ....
The second display added some "American historical documents
with theistic and Christian references" to the display.' 9 The counties
were now clearly trying to set the Commandments in a historical context, emphasizing the religious heritage of the United States as a
whole and Kentucky in particular.2" This was no help. Justice Souter,
author of the majority opinion, noted that the "sole common element"
binding together the Commandments and the historical documents in
the display was the "highlighted references to God."'" "The display's
unstinting focus was on religious passages" and thus displayed an "impermissible" religious purpose.2 2
The counties changed tack a third time, with a revised display titled
"Foundations of American Law and Government," in which the Commandments were accompanied by a collection of documents which expanded the theme far beyond "religious" history or heritage.2 3 The
additional documents included "the Magna Carta, the Declaration of
Independence, the Bill of Rights, the lyrics of the Star Spangled Ban15. Id. at 857-58 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting McCreary
County v. ACLU, 354 F.3d 438, 449, 451 (6th Cir. 2003)).
16. Id. at 872.
17. Id. at 868.
18. Id. at 869.
19. Id. at 869-70.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 870.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 870-73.
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ner, the Mayflower Compact, the National Motto, the Preamble to the
Kentucky Constitution, and a picture of Lady Justice. ' 24 Not surprisingly, the Court viewed the change (effected by the counties after
changing lawyers) and the additional documents as so much window
dressing. There was no "clear theme that might prevail over evidence
of the continuing religious object. 2' 5 The Commandments had not
been properly "integrated with other material so as to carry 'a secular
message,' "26 and the Court viewed the counties' primary purpose as
consistently religious.2 7 The historical documents approach had
failed.
B.

Van Orden: History That Meets the Test

The tables were turned in Van Orden, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist authored a plurality opinion that bypassed the Lemon test and
centered solely on the historical nature of the Decalogue. 28 "As we
explained in Lynch v. Donnelly," Rehnquist noted, "[t]here is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of
government of the role of religion in American life ....
,,29 Rehnquist
then surveyed this history, referring to Washington's first thanksgiving
proclamation 30 and reciting a string of cases in which the Court referred to America's religious heritage generally. 31 He noted the various Decalogue illustrations at the Supreme Court building and stated,
"Our opinions, like our building, have recognized the role the Deca3' 2
logue plays in America's heritage.
The key issue of course was whether the "profoundly sacred message"' 3 3 that Justice Stevens objected to in his forceful dissent overshadowed the historical message of the Commandments. The concern
was only briefly addressed in the plurality opinion:
Of course, the Ten Commandments are religious-they were so
viewed at their inception and so remain. The monument, therefore,
has religious significance ....But Moses was a lawgiver as well as a
religious leader. And the Ten Commandments have an undeniable
historical meaning, as the foregoing examples demonstrate. 34
24. Id. at 856.
25. Id. at 872.
26. Id. at 857.
27. Id. at 870-73.
28. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 685-686 (2005).
29. Id. at 686 (citation omitted) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674
(1984)).
30. Id. at 686-87.
31. Id. at 687-88.
32. Id. at 689.
33. Id. at 717 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 690 (plurality opinion).
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The final sentences of the opinion reiterate the point that the Decalogue monument was an acknowledgment of historical fact, not an impermissible, primarily religious expression by the Texas legislature:
Texas has treated its Capitol grounds monuments as representing
the several strands in the State's political and legal history. The inclusion of the Ten Commandments monument in this group has a
dual significance, partaking of both religion and government. We
cannot say that Texas' display.., violates the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.3 5
C.

Glassroth v. Moore: Acknowledging God, Not History

Standing in stark contrast to the mainstream historical approach
were the arguments put forward in defense of a Decalogue display in
Glassroth v. Moore.3 6 Roy Moore, chief justice of the Supreme Court
of Alabama, had installed a two-and-a-half ton granite monument in
the rotunda of the State Judicial Building. On top were the Ten Commandments; on the sides, historical quotations from American and legal history on the connection between God and law.37
In defending the display, Moore frequently emphasized the historical value of the Commandments in American and legal history. 38
What made the case unusual was that Moore steadfastly refused to
make the argument that the display had a "secular, historical purpose."3 9 Moore believed that the Commandments were primarily an
acknowledgment of God, not a history lesson. As he stated in a
speech when the monument was first unveiled, "You'll find no documents surrounding the Ten Commandments because they stand alone
as an acknowledgement of that God that's contained in our Pledge,
contained in our motto, and contained in our oath."4 °
Many erstwhile supporters of public Commandments displays
cringed upon learning that Moore would not argue any secular purpose.41 But to do so would be to compromise Moore's main goal in
35. Id. at 691-92.
36. Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1301 (M.D. Ala. 2002), affd, 335
F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003).
37. Glassroth, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1294-95, Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1285-86; MOORE,
supra note 7, at 140-42.
38. See, e.g., Glassroth, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1300, 1306-08.
39. Id. at 1301.
40. MOORE, supra note 7, at 147-48. This statement was used against Moore in
Glassroth, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1303.
41. See, e.g., Ted Haggard, Decalogue Debacle: What We Can Learn From a Monument Now Locked in an Alabama Closet, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, April 2004, at 98
(supportive of public Commandments displays, but "Moore should have known that,
as a public official, he should not favor one religion over another"). Others (not necessarily sympathetic) were simply flabbergasted at Moore's legal strategy. See, e.g.,
Andrew Cohen, The Legal Battle Over "Roy's Rock," CBSNEws.coM, Aug. 29, 2003,
http://www.cbsnews.comlstories/2003/08/29/news/opinionlcourtwatch/main570895.
shtml.
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posting the Commandments: to demonstrate that the acknowledgment of God is not an "establishment of religion." His defense of the
monument was a long shot effectively calling for the rejection of Supreme Court precedent. But to argue the case in order to meet the
neutrality standard would be to concede the key issue from the outset,
in Moore's view.
Not surprisingly, both the trial and appellate courts rejected
Moore's arguments. The opinions are filled with expressions of surprise at the openness of Moore's religious message. They also indicated that the outcome might have been different if Moore had played
the historical card right:
[A]s the evidence in this case more than adequately reflected, the
Ten Commandments have a secular aspect as well .... While the
secular aspect of the Ten Commandments can be emphasized, this
monument leaves no room for ambiguity about its religious
appearance. 42
This case is not as difficult as those in which the evidence reflected that the Ten Commandments display at issue had an arguably secular, historical purpose, for the evidence here does not even
begin to support that conclusion .... 43
The court appreciates that there are those who see a clear secular
purpose in the Ten Commandments .... If all Chief Justice Moore
had done were to emphasize the Ten Commandments' historical
and educational purpose (for the evidence shows that they have
been one of the sources of our secular laws) or their importance as a
model code for good citizenship (for we all want our children to
honor their parents, not to kill, not to steal, and
so forth), this court
44
would have a much different case before it.
None of this is surprising. Yet the course taken by Moore raises
important issues for consideration. Are the courts' decisions upholding Ten Commandments displays really reducing them to ceremonial
deisms, historical relics robbed of meaning by long repetition? Under
the current precedent, may a government official who views the Commandments as merely historical documents-rather than the word of
God-post the Decalogue, while a government official with strong religious beliefs may not? Are religious liberties litigators who attempt
to meet the Lemon test really gaining anything in the way of meaningful involvement of religious expression in the public? And what are
the theological implications of shoehorning the Decalogue into a
proper Lemon test display? These tend to be uncomfortable issues
42. Glassroth, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1300.
43. Id. at 1301.
44. Id. at 1318.
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for the religious liberty litigator, yet recognizing and dealing with
them is an essential task.
III.

TEN COMMANDMENTS AS HISTORY LESSON

A.

The Neutrality Standard

Neutrality is the paradigm in which Establishment Clause jurisprudence has operated for over half a century, ever since Everson v.
Board of Education4" was decided in 1947.46 The main matter of debate has been how to implement neutrality. The Lemon test is undoubtedly the most familiar test the courts have used in evaluating the
constitutionality of public religious expression: the expression must
have a secular purpose, a secular effect, and must not create entanglement with religion.4 7 It has been frequently criticized, 48 and alternate

views abound, with varied influence on the cases.4 9 Most influential
has been the "endorsement test,"5 0 championed by Justice
O'Connor.5 1 Most recent has been the historical approach, completely detached from Lemon, adopted by the Van Orden plurality.52
(The Van Orden plurality relied in part on Lynch v. Donnelly, the
somewhat enigmatical case "nominally applying '53 Lemon and at the
same time purporting to reject fixed tests,5 4 which ended up relying
substantially on a contextual-historical approach that could function
45. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
46. See also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216-17 (1963);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S.
844, 860 (2005).
47. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
48. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005); McCreary, 545 U.S. at
890 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that a majority of members of the then-current
Court had criticized Lemon); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384, 398-99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Van Orden, 545 U.S.
at 692-93 (Thomas, J., concurring); Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Allegheny County v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-56 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. See Marcia S. Alembik, Note, The Future of the Lemon Test A Sweeter Alternative for Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 GA. L. REV. 1171, 1180-88 (2006). See
also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686.
50. Adopted in Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597.
51. Id. at 624-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). See also ACLU v.
Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435, 1444-45 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying the endorsement test).
52. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 685-86.
53. DOUGLAS W. KMIEC ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HisTORY, CASES, AND PHILOSOPHY 192 (2d ed. 2004). See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679 (citing
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
54. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678.
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without much reliance on Lemon.55 ) When the courts do apply
Lemon, the test has been often modified. Sometimes the entanglement and effect prongs are merged together; 56 other cases have combined the purpose and effect prongs. 57 The common thread amidst
this chaos, running through all of the post-Everson Establishment

Clause jurisprudence,
58
neutrality.

has

been

a professed

commitment

to

In analyzing the Ten Commandments cases, the Lemon test remains

predominant. But for our purposes, it may be helpful to think in the
broader terms of neutrality in general, 59 a philosophical neutrality in
which the government supposedly abstains from aligning itself with

one religious group over another. Within neutrality, we are including
(1) the Lemon test; (2) the endorsement test; and (3) the ill-defined
"historical test," as used in the Van Orden plurality opinion. Justice

Thomas's coercion test6" is not included in this neutrality category, for
while it is presented as a method of neutrality analysis, it really does
not operate in the same philosophical neutrality paradigm.6 1 Within
the neutrality framework, we wish to quickly look at the common ar-

guments that are made to show that the Commandments do not violate the neutrality standard when posted on public grounds.
B.

Fitting the Commandments into the Neutrality Paradigm:
The Legal Approach

The common charge is that by posting the Commandments, the government takes sides with the Judeo-Christian scriptures over and
against all other religions-thus, no neutrality.6" In defense of the
Commandments displays, it is usually argued that the defendant dis55. See also Glenn S. Gordon, Note, Lynch v. Donnelly: Breaking Down the Barriers to Religious Displays, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 185, 185 (1985); Joshua D. Zarrow,
Comment, Of Crosses and Creches: The Establishment Clause and Public Displays of
Religious Symbols, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 477, 479 (1986).
56. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 218, 232-33 (1997).
57. See, e.g., Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 258-59 (3d Cir.
2003); Modrovich v. Allegheny County, 385 F.3d 397, 401-02 (3d Cir. 2004). See also
Susanna Dokupil, "Thou Shalt Not Bear False Witness": "Sham" Secular Purposes in
Ten Commandments Displays, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 609, 635 (2005).

58. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice
Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 Nw.
U.L. REV. 1097, 1099-1101 (2006).
59. This should not to be confused with an explicit "neutrality test," as discussed
in Alembik, supra note 49, at 1185-87, and adopted in Rosenberger v. Rector, 515
U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995). This test fits within the general "philosophical neutrality"
classification scheme.
60. Distinct from Justice Kennedy's coercion test (introduced in Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992)). See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49
(2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
61. See discussion infra, Part IV.
62. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 708-09 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir.
2001); Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 486, 489 (6th Cir. 2002).
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played the Commandments with one or another (or all) of several historical purposes in view.6 3 The goal of the display is thus educational
rather than religious, and the education is historical, not religious. If
this is done effectively, the requirement of neutrality is met (whether
this means satisfying the Lemon test, the endorsement test, or an historical analysis). The arguments identifiable from the cases can be
roughly classed into three groups: legal history, American history, and
the history of ethics. This Comment will examine these arguments in
descending order of their success in the courts.
1. Legal History
First, the Commandments may be considered neutral when the
Commandments are presented as a part of legal history. The frieze in
the Supreme Court is the ultimate example,6 4 showing Moses with the
Ten Commandments in the midst of seventeen other lawgivers from
world history, including Hammurabi and Confucius.65 Numerous
Decalogue decisions (and dissents) have included some reference to
the Commandments' "influence[ ] on the development of Western legal thought."6 6 The display in the Supreme Court has been cited frequently as the ideal integration of the Commandments into such a
properly secular display.6 7
2.

American History

The Commandments may be considered neutral when presented as
a part of American history. This argument has been presented from
two angles: (1) America's strong religious heritage in public and private life6 8 or (2) a key influence on America's legal history.6 9
When the Commandments are displayed as representative of American social-religious heritage, the courts have split. In Van Orden, the
63. See infra, notes 64-80, and accompanying text.
64. See Dokupil, supra note 57, at 614, 649-50.
65. See Courtroom Friezes, North and South Walls, http://www.supremecourtus.
gov/about/north&southwalls.pdf (last visited October 27, 2007).
66. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 712, n.9 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 869 (2005); Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d
857, 865-66 (7th Cir. 2005); Christian v. City of Grand Junction, No. 01-D-685, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25349, at *15-16 (D. Colo.June 26, 2001) (finding sufficient secular
purpose under the Lemon test where the goal "in displaying the monument is not to
endorse a religious message, but instead, to memorialize the rule of law"); Suhre v.
Haywood County, 55 F. Supp. 2d 384, 385, 394 (W.D.N.C. 1999); State v. Freedom
from Religion Found., 898 P.2d 1013, 1018, 1024 (Colo. 1995). An early case is Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 34 (10th Cir. 1973).
67. See, e.g., McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 874; Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 688; Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 677 (1984); Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 652
(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Adland, 307 F.3d at 481;
ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 449 (6th Cir. 2002). See also Dokupil,
supra note 57, at 614, 649-50.
68. See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681, 691.
69. See, e.g., McCreary, 545 U.S. at 856-57.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol14/iss2/11
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V14.I2.10

10

Weinberger: The
Monument and the Message:
Pragmatism
and Principle in Establi
LITIGATION
CLAUSE
ESTABLISHMENT

2008]

plurality found that this purpose was sufficiently neutral. 70 However,
the dissent argued that the message conveyed to non-adherents is that

of exclusion, placing the government behind one religious tradition

(Judeo-Christianity, to the exclusion of all others). 71 Such an ac-

knowledgment of American religious heritage is not neutral and
hence impermissible.
Caution must also be exercised in arguing that the Commandments
are a key component of American legal history. Despite the fact that
the courts often strike down a display for failing to integrate the Commandments with the history on display, claims that the Command-

ments were influential on the Declaration of Independence or the
Constitution have not been well received by the courts: as Justice Stevens wrote in his Van Orden dissent, courts have been wary of the
"specific claim that the Ten Commandments played a significant role

in the development of our Nation's foundational documents ....

[A]t72

the very least the question is a matter of intense scholarly debate.

In other words, courts may not view the Commandments-as-legal-history favorably when they are presented in an American-specific context.73 It is safer not to push beyond the general legal history category
and stay within the limits of the Supreme Court's frieze.74

Distinguished from these first two American history arguments is
the idea that the particular Commandments display at issue is itself a
work of art, or historical artwork. In this case, there may be a legiti-

mate secular purpose in preserving the display for the sake of art itself. 75 As one court noted, "Given our national interest in historical
preservation, we believe we would set a dangerous precedent if we
70. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691-92. See also ACLU v. City of Plattsmouth, 419
F.3d 772, 776-79 (8th Cir. 2005); Freedom from Religion Found., 898 P.2d at 1018,
1020-21. See also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 674-75 (showing the acknowledgement of God
and religion throughout American history).
71. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 718-19 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Adland, 307 F.3d at 486, 489; Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 771
(7th Cir. 2001).
72. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 712, n.9 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. See, e.g., McCreary, 545 U.S. at 858, 872-73 (acknowledging the Commandments as influential legal documents, but rejecting argument that they directly influenced the Declaration of Independence). See also Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp.
2d 1290, 1318 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (evidence established that the Commandments were a
source of American secular law). But see Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857,
864-66 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding secular purpose where county displayed Commandments for their importance for the Western legal tradition generally and the Declaration of Independence in particular); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 898 P.2d at
1018, 1026.
74. See Dokupil, supra note 57, at 614, 649-50.
75. See Modrovich v. Allegheny County, 385 F.3d 397, 410-11 (3d Cir. 2004);
Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 265-66 (3d Cir. 2003). See also
Stephanie Francis Ward, In With the Old, Out With the New: Courts Allow Ten Commandments Display When It's Historical,But Not When It's Recently Installed, 2 ABA
JOURNAL EREPORT 26 (July 3, 2003), available at 2 No. 26 ABAJEREP 1 (Westlaw).
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were to hold that any relic containing a religious message should be

removed

.

*...'76

3. History of Ethics
Third, the Commandments may be considered neutral when the
Commandments are presented for their historical contribution to ethics and philosophy generally. This is often mentioned separately in
the cases.77 Breyer's eccentric concurring opinion in Van Orden was

at least in the mainstream in conveying this sentiment: "In certain
contexts, a display of the tablets of the Ten Commandments can convey not simply a religious message but also a secular moral message
(about proper standards of social conduct). '78 The Court alluded to
this in Stone v. Graham when it noted that the "Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics,
comparative religion, or the like."' 79 However, the Commandments
generally are cited for their historic contribution to understanding
"standards of social conduct," not for being the current embodiment
of "proper standards."8 0 Logically, then, the "universal morality"

theme is just one more historical base for the Commandments to rest
on.
C. Fitting the Commandments into the Neutrality Paradigm:
The Theological Problem

It is appropriate to change gears here and turn from the cases to the
theological concerns they raise. Does a public display of the Commandments as a non-religious document violate theological principles

and offend religious sensibilities? Should it? From opposite ends of
the ideological spectrum, Justice Stevens and Justice Roy Moore have
agreed that the neutrality requirements effectively eliminate the religious element of the monument, or at least render it incidental to the
76. Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 410.
77. See, e.g., Books, 401 F.3d at 865-66; Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 898
P.2d at 1024.
78. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in
judgment).
79. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (per curiam). Compare McCreary
County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 853 (2005) (rejecting an attempt to display the Commandments as the foundation of Kentucky's civil and criminal laws), with ACLU v.
Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir., 2004) (stating that the Commandments could
be used to teach in the classroom but the particular display was not posted with a
valid secular purpose), Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1318 (M.D. Ala.
2002) (recognizing a secular purpose for the Commandments but rejecting the display
at issue), Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 2001)
(holding Ten Commandments posting not constitutional because of primarily religious
purpose), and Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593-94 (1987) (implying that teaching creationism with other theories of the origin of humankind was constitutionally
acceptable).
80. Pushing those bounds, however, is ACLU v. Board of Commissioners, 444 F.
Supp. 2d 805, 812 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
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secular message. This is the outcome that Justice
Stevens said,
81
"def[ies] credibility and disserve[s] people of faith."
Indeed, there are very good reasons to see a "secular" version of
the Decalogue as troubling in light of just two of the most familiar
sources in the Christian tradition: the Lord's Prayer and the Decalogue itself.
The Third Commandment 82 states, "Thou shalt not take the name
of the Lord thy God in vain; for the Lord will not hold him guiltless
that taketh his name in vain."' 83 To take God's name in vain, many
theologians have noted, is not limited to merely using it in a profane
manner. 8 1 It applies to using God's name for a purpose irrespective of
the honor accorded to His name.8 5 As Calvin put it:
There is a manifest synecdoche in this Commandment; for in order
that God may procure for His name its due reverence, He forbids its
being taken in vain ....Whence we infer on the other hand an
affirmative commandment . . . . His name is
86 to be reverently
honoured ... whenever mention of it is made.
This emphasis is also familiar in Judaism: the fear of the Lord, being a
combination of what Westerners typically think of as fear, reverence,
and love, is basic in Jewish theology and practice.8 7
In Christian theology, this point is reinforced by the precepts underlying the Lord's prayer, "Hallowed be thy name."8' 8 Commenting on
this passage, Augustine wrote:
And this is prayed . . . not as if the name of God were not holy
already, but that it may be held holy by men; i.e., that God may so
become known to them, that they shall reckon nothing more holy,
and which they are more afraid of offending ....And so there His
81. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 717 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
82. For convenience, adopting the Protestant numbering system. See 3
HODGE, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

CHARLES

272-75 (photo. reprint 1975) (1872).

83. Exodus 20:7.

84. 2 C.F.

KEIL

& F.

DELITZSCH, BIBLICAL COMMENTARY ON THE OLD TESTA-

MENT 118 (James Martin trans. 1949).
85. See, e.g., 1 JOHN GILL, EXPOSITION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT 429 (1810) (stating that "in vain" refers to making "use of the name Lord or God ...in a light and
trifling way, without any shew of reverence of him, and affection to him"); KEIL & F.
DELITZSCH, supra note 84, at 118 (noting that "vain" "denotes that which is waste and
in disorder, hence that which is empty, vain, and nugatory, for which there is no occasion." ); JOSEPH S. EXELL, THE PREACHER'S COMPLETE HOMILETIC COMMENTARY

ON THE BOOK OF EXODUS 353 (n.d.) (God's name taken in vain "when it is not made

use of to good purpose; that is, to God's honour").

86. 2 JOHN CALVIN, COMMENTARIES ON THE FOUR LAST BOOKS OF MOSES, ARRANGED IN THE FORM OF A HARMONY 408 (Charles William Bingham trans., 1853).
See also 2 JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, 333-34 (Henry

Beveridge trans., 1989).

87. See, e.g., HAYIM HALEVY DONIN, To BE A JEW: A GUIDE TO JEWISH OBSERVANCE IN CONTEMPORARY LIFE 143 (1972).

88. Matthew 6:9. See also Luke 11:2.
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name is said to be holy,89where He is named with veneration and the
fear of offending Him.

If our foremost duty when mentioning the name of God is giving
Him honor, then clearly there will be trouble when the Commandments are displayed within the neutrality paradigm. When the Commandments are displayed as a secular document, the word and name
of God are a secondary message at best or meaningless at worst.
IV. THE MYTH OF NEUTRALITY
But is the situation really so bad? Of course the Ten Commandments are religious, but they also have a secular significance, and the
fact that they have secular significance does not extinguish the religious meaning. It seems quite plausible that you can display the Commandments for a secular purpose and a religious purpose and thereby
get around the problem of reducing the Commandments to meaninglessness. 90 However, in practice, the broad neutrality requirement (as
we are using the term) does tend to force the religious purpose into
oblivion if the monument is to be upheld.9 1
A.

Purpose, Meaning, and the Reduction of the Commandments

Meaning and purpose should be clearly distinguished. Although religious and secular meanings may coexist, it is rare that religious and
secular purposes can, in the way the courts currently use the terms. To
gain perspective, let's leave the Commandments for a moment and
consider instead a public display on the history of law that features a
copy of the Magna Carta. It includes the clause calling for the elimination of the "fish-weirs" in the Thames. 92 In the normal instance at
least, we are displaying the Magna Carta for its historical significance
in the development of Anglo-Saxon law, not because we today are
concerned with the fish-weirs that were in the Thames in 1215. However, the fact that we are posting the Magna Carta, fish-weirs and all,
89. 6 ST. AUGUSTIN, Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, in 6 NICENE AND POSTNICENE FATHERS, FIRST SERIES 40 (Philip Schaff ed., William Findlay trans., Win. B.
Eerdmans Publ'g Co. 1979) (1888). See also 1 JOHN CALVIN, COMMENTARY ON A
HARMONY OF THE EVANGELISTS, MATTHEW, MARK, AND LuKE 318-319 (William
Pringle trans., 1949); THE WYCLIFFE BIBLE COMMENTARY 939 (Charles F. Pfeiffer &

Everett F. Harrison eds., 1962) ("the meaning [of the word hallowed] is, 'be held in
reverence, treated as holy"'); 1 ALBERT BARNES, NOTES ON THE NEW TESTAMENT:
EXPLANATORY AND PRACTICAL 66 (Robert Frew ed. 1949) ("God's name is essentially holy; and the meaning of this petition is, 'Let thy name be celebrated, venerated,
and esteemed as holy everywhere, and receive from all men proper honour.'").
90. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690 (2005).
91. See Dokupil, supra note 57, at 627-28. See also Herbert W. Titus, Restoring
the Rule of Law to the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, 5 OAK BROOK C. J. L. & GOV'T POL'Y 1, 51-53 (2006).
92. The "fish-weirs" or "kydells" included generally all obstacles to navigation of
the Thames. See R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the Ius Commune, 66 U. CHI. L.
REv. 297, 355-56 (1999).
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for a reason quite beyond its face-value message hardly implies that
the Magna Carta's statement about the "fish-weirs" is meaningless. It

just means that we can display a written document for a reason apart
from its prima facie literary meaning without taking away that meaning. So far, so good: by analogy, we can post the Commandments for
their historical value without declaring their words meaningless. We
may acknowledge the meaning. Yet the meaning of the text is also

distinct from the purpose in posting the document. The purpose of
posting the Magna Carta is its historical value in the development of
Anglo-Saxon law.
But suppose that the public official posting the display actually believes, as well, that the government must enforce the removal of "fishweirs" in some local river. The public official believes that the Magna
Carta's prima facie literary meaning is relevant, perhaps obligatory,
for us to act on today. Now the meaning of the document has become

entwined with the purpose for which it was posted. This is the problem with the Commandments: generally, the people who care about
the role the Commandments played in history-who care enough to
post them in public-care precisely because they believe in the God

the Commandments acknowledge. Under neutrality analysis, we may
be able to acknowledge that the Commandments have religious meaning. But to take this next step and say, "I believe in, support, and
adhere to that meaning," suddenly changes everything.

First, despite professing a "deference" to the professed purposes of
the displayers, in practice, courts have not infrequently found the professed purpose to be a "sham" when the displayer's religious beliefs
become known.93 The display would thus fail the purpose prong of
Lemon.94 Second, the courts often employ a "reasonable person"
standard to determine if the display has the prohibited effect.9 5 This
reasonable person is generally well informed of the relevant facts sur-

rounding the display, and if this means that the observer knows of the
displayer's religious intent, this may convert an otherwise historical
display into an endorsement of religion (failing the "effect" prong of
93. See Dokupil, supra note 57, at 627-28. See also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,
41 (1980) (per curiam); McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 864, 865 n.13 (2005)
("deference to legislatures" that "credits any valid purpose, no matter how trivial, has
not been the way the Court has approached government action that implicates establishment"); Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 480 (6th Cir. 2002); Baker v. Adams
County/Ohio Valley Sch. Bd., 86 F. App'x 104,110 (6th Cir. 2004). Compare Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (courts have a duty "to 'distinguis[h]
a sham secular purpose from a sincere one"'), with Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578, 586-87 (1987) (requiring courts to examine the stated purpose and ensure that
the legislature omitted all sectarian endorsement).
94. See generally Dokupil, supra note 57 (discussing sham secular purposes
throughout the history of Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
95. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866; Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Granzeier v. Middleton,
173 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases).
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Lemon).96 Finally, though it may not effect entanglement, 97 it may

send a message of exclusion to non-adherents,9 8 thereby failing the
endorsement test.99

To put this conundrum in somewhat different terms, you may display the Commandments for a purpose (such as their impact on legal
history) that is distinct from their meaning. But this leaves open the
question of whether your purpose also includes the promotion of the
Commandment's prima facie message. To answer "Yes" means you

support the theistic First Commandment, and courts generally find

that this violates neutrality under one analysis or another. 100 But to

answer "No" means you are displaying the Commandments without
agreeing with them, which for the believer is a violation of the Third
Commandment and the duty Scripture tells us we owe to God. It ap-

pears, then, that under current precedent, the Christian public official
has a choice between constitutional impermissibility and theological

impermissibility.
B.

Predominant Secular Purpose: Sacred and Secular
Are Not Equals

The situation looks even worse from a theological standpoint when
the courts have looked for a predominant secular purpose in posting
the Commandments, rather than just "a secular . . . purpose."'10 The
McCreary Court spoke of the secular and religious purposes predomi-

nating over each other, with the implied requirement that "secular
purpose 'predominate' over any purpose to advance religion."10 2 This
approach goes beyond the already-problematic Lemon requirements
by rejecting the premise that, at least theoretically, religious and secular purposes may be of equal importance. The new "predominant"
terminology requires that any religious message be secondary to the

secular purpose. Little room exists for a devout Christian to post the
Commandments in a manner acceptable to the Court, without at the
same time violating his religious duty to honor God. In fact, the

courts' current neutrality analyses present us with the somewhat
96. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866.
97. The entanglement prong of Lemon is not usually at issue in the Commandments cases. See, e.g., Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857, 859 n.1 (7th Cir. 2005);
ACLU v. Rutherford County, 209 F. Supp. 2d 799, 805 n.6 (M.D. Tenn. 2002); ACLU
v. Mercer County, 432 F.3d 624, 627 n.2 (6th Cir. 2005).
98. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989).
99. See Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 484-87 (6th Cir. 2002).
100. See, e.g., Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) ("Chief
Justice Moore testified candidly that his purpose ... was to acknowledge the law and
sovereignty of the God of the Holy Scriptures," and therefore violated the Establishment Clause).
101. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (emphasis added).
102. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 901 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 865 (majority opinion).
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anomalous possibility that a non-believer defendant who posted a
Commandments display would be more successful in getting it upheld
than would a believer.
C.

Ceremonial Deism: Commandments Without Meaning

Third, and perhaps most disturbing, is the occasional use of the
"ceremonial deism" analysis by the courts. Under this rationale, a re10 3
ligious expression is accepted only because it has lost its meaning.
Justice O'Connor gave a revealing discussion of ceremonial deism in
the context of the Pledge of Allegiance, explaining that long use and
historical ubiquity can make a theistic reference constitutionally acceptable because it has lost its religious meaning."4 Justice O'Connor
said of the Pledge, "Any religious freight the words may have been
meant to carry originally has long since been lost."1 5 Clearly, the
possibility of having a Commandments monument upheld on similar
grounds is distressing (more distressing
than having it struck down)
10 6
from a theological perspective.
In sum, it appears that the courts, as they currently treat the issue,
leave little room for those who wish to keep both the monument and
the message in a public display. The root problem is not so much the
specific tests, but rather the guiding philosophical presuppositions underlying them. "Neutrality," as the courts use the term, is not neutral.
In practice, it is the absence of theism from the public sphere. Philosophers and theologians have argued that genuine philosophical neutrality has never been possible; 10 7 it is not surprising that the courts
are unable to deliver on their promise of providing an absolutely neutral public sphere.

103. See generally Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionalityof Ceremonial
Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2091-96 (1996) (discussing several courts' analyses
on ceremonial deism).
104. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37-43 (2003) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in judgment). See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (ceremonial deisms "protected from Establishment Clause
scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any significant religious
content")105. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 41 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
106. Thus far, the Commandments have been found to fail to qualify as "ceremonial deisms." See ACLU v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2004); Freethought
Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2003).
107. See generally GREG L. BAHNSEN, ALWAYS READY: DIRECTIONS FOR DEFENDING THE FAITH 3-9 (Robert R. Booth ed., 1996) (arguing that Christians should not
be neutral); GREG L. BAHNSEN, VAN TIL's APOLOGETIC: READINGS AND ANALYSIS
101-02, 127-28, 145-54 (1998) [hereinafter BAHNSEN, VAN TIL] (discussing Van Til's
beliefs regarding neutrality); Roy A. CLOUSER, THE MYTH OF RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY: AN ESSAY ON THE HIDDEN ROLE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF IN THEORIES (rev. ed.
2005) (discussing the effect of religious beliefs on the development of theories).
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MONUMENT AND MESSAGE: ACKNOWLEDGING GOD IN PUBLIC

If, as this Comment has argued, it is not theologically permissible
for a committed Christian (or Jew) to post the Ten Commandments
with the typical profession of secular, historical purpose, then the options available are:
(1) Do not post the Commandments as a government official; or
(2) Post the Commandments and forthrightly state all the purposes for which they are posted.
Our starting point has been that some people wish to post the Commandments when in government office, and given this, they wish to do
so without violating their religious duty to honor God. This is not the
place for an extended discussion of why believers may wish, or believe
themselves to have a religious obligation, to acknowledge God in public. Suffice it to say that the option of not posting the Commandments
isthe position advocated by those who are generally critics of religion
in the public sphere (Justice Stevens in his Van Orden dissent, for example).10 8 This position appears to advocate "separation" of religion
and government out of theological sensitivity to believers, as well as
out of a desire to protect offended minorities. Behind the superficial
appeal of this approach is the inconvenient fact that Christians have
long recognized that the acknowledgment of God is a duty. 10 9 Psalm 2
poetically commands, "Be wise now therefore, 0 ye kings: be instructed, ye judges of the earth. Serve the LORD with fear, and rejoice
with trembling. Kiss the Son .

. . ."11

Without belaboring the point,

there is a strong tradition across denominational lines that the believer is to honor God in every station of life, including in the position
of judge, mayor, or other civil magistrate. So option (1), not posting
the Commandments at all, is not the one in which to look.
A. A PrincipledApproach: Worth Trying?

It appears that the only option left for a religious believer posting
the Commandments-stating all the purposes for which the Decalogue is posted-is doomed under the current precedent. While there
are alternate legal paths that offer hope, the Author freely concedes
the obvious fact that trying a new legal argument would increase the
difficulty of succeeding in Ten Commandments litigation. Despite this
108. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 716 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

109. Compare two strong statements of this duty, from the Protestant and Catholic
traditions, respectively: 1 JOHN CALVIN, COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF PSALMS
22-27 (James Anderson trans., photo. reprint 2005) (1845) [hereinafter PSALMS]
(commenting on the Protestant view of the individual's duty of acknowledgement),
and Pope Leo XIII, The Christian Constitution of States, Encyclical Letter Immortale
Dei, Nov. 1, 1885, inJOHN A. RYAN & MOORHOUSE F.X. MILLAR, THE STATE AND
THE CHURCH 1, 2-4 (1924) available at http://www.ewtn.com/library/encyc/l13sta.htm
(stating the Catholic view of the individual's duty of acknowledgement).
110. Psalms 2:10-11; see 1 CALVIN, PSALMS, supra note 109, at 22-27.
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fact, there are merits to arguing a principled position which may rely
on a less-established legal theory.
12
11
This is obviously a choice between principle ' and pragmatism.1
From a Christian ethical perspective, the choice is clear: principle
must control. 113 It would be ironic-and sad-to have the Decalogue,
the epitome of moral absolutes, defended by arguments which ignore
the principles in favor of pragmatism.
Beyond even the theological consideration, it is worth pointing out
that to win a decision that reaches the right result on the wrong
grounds-which compromises the principle-is really quite meaningless. It is rather like an attorney, hoping for school integration (in preBrown v. Board of Education"4 days), who takes the case of Johnny,
an African-American who wishes to be admitted to a hypothetical
White Elementary School. The well-intentioned attorney argues that
the school board should allow Johnny into the school because he is
"white," within the meaning of that term as established by prior case
law. Maybe the attorney will get Johnny into White Elementary, but
little has been accomplished; the racist presuppositions of segregation
have not been disturbed. If public Commandments displays deserve
legal defense, they should receive a defense that preserves their
meaning.
B.

A PragmaticPrincipledApproach: Reasons for Hope

Up to this point, the Author has been pressing the antithesis between a theologically sound principle-based approach and a pragmatic
results-oriented approach. Antithesis is necessary," 5 yet it often creates misunderstandings. While emphasizing the difference between
the pragmatic and the principled approaches to legal defense of the
Commandments, there is a danger of creating a false principle-pragmatism dichotomy.
The clarification that is necessary at this point is that principle is to
control the course taken, but that one can be pragmatic in the way
that one honors the principle. In other words, faithfulness to principle
111. Referring generally to an ethically absolutist approach. For an overview and
discussion of the major classifications of Christian absolutism, see NORMAN L. GESLER, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 79-132 (1989).
112. Referring generally to an ethical approach emphasizing expedience. See id. at
45.
113. See generally id. at 17-27 (contrasting different ethical and moral views with
Christianity and explaining the Christian ethical duty to do what is right even if the
correct result may not be reached). Those who would disagree, e.g., JOSEPH
FLETCHER, SITUATION ETHICS: THE NEW MORALITY

36 (1966), are not representa-

tive of traditional, or mainstream, Christian ethics.
114. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding race-based segregation in
public schools to be unconstitutional).
115. See BAHNSEN, VAN TIL, supra note 107, at 276-77 (discussing a Christian philosophy of antithesis).
Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

19

TexasTEXAS
WesleyanWESLEYAN
Law Review, Vol.
14 [2022],
Iss. 2, Art. 11
LAW
REVIEW

[Vol. 14

does not mean that one must make a martyr of oneself. It is possible
to force the antithesis while avoiding the dichotomy.
In adopting a pragmatic-principled approach, one may not be able
to work entirely within the current court precedent. But on the other
hand, one may not have to invent theories entirely new to the courts
either. Without proposing an "ideal" test that the courts ought to use
to decide Commandments cases, one may start by looking at ways of
working with ideas already current in the courts that would avoid the
theological problems.
The root problem in current Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
the mythical ideal of neutrality. As this Comment has shown, the
courts tend to view the neutrality requirement as violated whenever a
government actor gives meaningful recognition to God-and such
"neutrality" is quite discriminatory against meaningful religious expression. The goal of the religious-liberty litigator defending a Commandments display must be, then, to argue his case so as to bypass the
absolute neutrality requirement. There are at least two ways this can
be done. First, the "purpose" prong of the Lemon test, when separated from the neutrality goal, can actually be presented to the courts
in a manner compatible with both the language of Lemon and theological concerns. That is, it may be possible to operate within the
terms of the Lemon test while subtly shifting away from the neutrality
paradigm. Second, it is always an option to work for an outright rejection of Lemon and the adoption of an alternate test. Justice Thomas's
coercion test may fit the bill ideally, both for its straightforward application" 6 and for the way in which it alters the courts' traditional and
problematic neutrality standard.
C.

Remaking the Purpose Test

The urge to reduce the religious aspect of a Decalogue display
arises not so much from the language of Lemon's purpose test as it
does from the neutrality presupposition. Lemon merely
requires that
117
a monument be erected for "a secular ... purpose.''
First of all, it should be clarified that it is not necessary to deny
secular purpose in honoring the principle of acknowledging God first
and foremost. The courts generally use the term "secular purpose" to
denominate a purpose related to education and to history." 8 "Secular" purpose does not, as the courts have used it, mean "godless" purpose. Rather, it indicates a purpose from a "secular" area of life:
116. This is a point acknowledged even by critics. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 58, at
1101.
117. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
118. Compare Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980), and McCreary County v.
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 854, 857-58, 871 (2005) (education as a secular purpose), with
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691 (2005), and McCreary, 545 U.S. at 871, 874
(history as secular purpose).
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education in history is "secular," and education about the duty to God
is "religious." This is unfortunate terminology.' 19 Leading Christian
intellectuals have decried the twentieth-century trend to divide life
into the "secular" and the "sacred," a legacy of many factors, including notably the Fundamentalist withdrawal from the public sphere in
the 1920s. 121 Christian faith applies to all of life. 121 History 122 and
education1 23 are not outside its ambit. Therefore, it is entirely valid
for a Christian to post a monument with a purpose of educating the
public and honoring history. This is theologically a "religious" act in
the sense of being under God but is still what the courts would term
"secular." Admittedly, no one enjoys such semantic tangles, but given
the current court precedent, such a careful parsing of the terminology
is necessary. So, there is nothing inherently wrong theologically in
admitting to what the court calls "secular purpose." What is problematic is to claim that there is no purpose or meaning in the acknowledgment of God.
So, the religious-liberties litigator should not argue that the Commandments are ceremonial deisms, that they are religiously neutral, or
that they are posted for secular purpose alone. A theologically selfconscious litigator may forthrightly state that they are a meaningful
religious statement. A Christian defendant who has posted a Commandments display may admit to having the primary purpose of honoring God with the display, with a secondary secular purpose. If the
courts uphold the monument, they will be departing from the judicial
trend of looking for a "predominantsecular purpose" but will not be
departing from the terminology of Lemon. The key in this argument
is to recognize the theological limits of the argument: God must be
first; secular purpose is fine as long as it is used as shorthand for history and education, which the Christian recognizes to be under God
anyway. Once these presuppositions are clearly established, the job of
the litigators is to convince the court to stick with the original Lemon
language. In the process, "neutrality," qua a theism-free public
sphere, is bypassed. To all of this, a caveat should be added: working
within the terminology of Lemon is an option that does not violate the
Christian's duty to acknowledge God, but remaking a test originally
forged in the neutrality paradigm is a minimal advance forward. This
119. See Titus, supra note 91, at 51-53.
120. See generally MARK A. NOLL, THE SCANDAL OF THE EVANGELICAL MIND
109-14 (1994) (discussing the withdrawal of clergymen from the educational arena).
121. See generally DAVID F. NAUGLE, WORLDVIEW: THE HISTORY OF A CONCEPT 4
(2002) (commenting on the recognition of Christianity as a total worldview).
122. See, e.g., DAVID A. NOEBEL, UNDERSTANDING THE TIMES: THE RELIGIOUS
WORLDVIEWS OF OUR DAY AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH 763-90 (1991); C. Gregg
Singer, The Problem of Historical Interpretation, in FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN
SCHOLARSHIP: ESSAYS IN THE VAN TIL PERSPECTIVE 53 (Gary North ed., 1976) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS].
123. See, e.g., William N. Blake, Van Til's Vision for Education, in FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 122, at 103.
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type of reworking is the least a theologically self-conscious religiousliberties litigator should settle for, but he should not stop there.124
Some much more substantial change in Establishment Clause analysis
is the ultimate goal.
D.

Neutrality Deflated

Remaking Lemon is a partial solution; it allows the Christian public
official to honor God with the monument, but it leaves the courts with
a test that is far from ideal. Justice Scalia's concurrence in Van Orden
suggests the correct goals: "I would prefer to... adopt[ ] an Establishment Clause jurisprudence that ...

[recognizes] that there is nothing

unconstitutional in a State's favoring religion generally, honoring God
through public prayer and acknowledgment, or,125in a nonproselytizing
manner, venerating the Ten Commandments.,
Fortunately for these purposes, the Lemon test is not the be-all,
end-all of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and other ways of
analysis that are not entirely foreign to the courts offer promising alternatives. Justice Scalia's dissent in McCreary offers a history-focused analysis designed to allow for a genuine acknowledgment of
God.1 26 Unlike the regular "neutrality" history analysis, Scalia's approach is historical in the sense that it looks at the historic practice of
sincerely acknowledging God (a practice accepted by the framers 1of
27
the First Amendment) as indicative of the Amendment's meaning.
While Scalia's approach is appealing to those of a conservative bent,
it is less likely to win judicial acceptance than is Justice Thomas's coercion test.2 8 The coercion test as Thomas offers it would also be comfortable with a meaningful religious acknowledgment in a
Commandments display.' 29 As Justice Thomas has argued, a display
of the Commandments does not coerce people to look at them; if they
do, it does not coerce them to venerate either the text or the principle
the Commandments enunciate.' 30 "The mere presence of the monu124. Among other things, the Lemon test is weighed down with the baggage of the
theologically problematic and intellectually stifling sacred-secular dichotomy, discussed above.
125. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
126. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 885-900 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
127. Id. at 885-94.
128. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52-53 (2003)
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692-96 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). See also Vincent Phillip Munoz, THOU SHALT NOT POST THE TEN COMMANDMENTS? McCreary, Van Orden, and the Future of Religious Display Cases, 10
TEX. REV. LAw & POL. 357, 374-75, 388-89 (2006).
129. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 695-97 (Thomas, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 694. See also Richard F. Duncan, Justice Thomas and the PartialIncorporation of the Establishment Clause: Herein of Structural Limitations, Liberty Interests, and Taking Incorporation Seriously, 20 REGENT U. L. REV. 37, 46-47
(2007-2008) (citing Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 694).
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ment along his path involves no coercion and thus does not violate the
Establishment Clause."' 3 1
Significantly, Thomas's approach ostensibly operates within the
neutrality paradigm. 3 2 Neutrality, as this Comment discussed earlier,
is problematic because it is a philosophical approach in which the government supposedly abstains from aligning itself with one religious
group over another-a philosophically naive, theologically problematic approach that necessitated the reduction of the Commandments.
However, Thomas's coercion test escapes this pitfall by effectively
transforming "neutrality" into simple non-coercion. The trick is to allow non-coercion to define neutrality, rather than allowing itself to be
defined by neutrality. If non-coercion can succeed as the definition of
neutrality, as opposed to some mythical absolute philosophical neutrality, then the Christian public official has won a significant base of
operations.
Justice Thomas's coercion approach has hopeful prospects on the
Court itself. Justice Scalia has suggested an approach to coercion similar to Thomas S133 and would be practically certain to support
Thomas's approach in a decision. Thomas may also have an ally in
Justice Kennedy. Kennedy has advocated a coercion test considerably
broader than Thomas's1 34 version, but has expressed similar views to
those of Thomas on religious displays. 135 If Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy would join in a Commandments decision based on non-coercion,
the only question remaining is whether Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito would also join. If the widespread speculation regarding
their conservative views is anywhere near accurate, it appears possible-indeed, hopeful-that a carefully presented
coercion test argu1 36
ment would be adopted by the Supreme Court.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The neutrality paradigm has reigned supreme in the courts' Establishment Clause jurisprudence for over fifty years. It has resulted in
many decisions that have generally removed meaningful acknowledgment of God from the public square, even when a display of an ostensibly religious document like the Decalogue is allowed to remain. The
theological implications have gone unnoticed for too long; identifying
and discussing this has been this Comment's first objective. The Au131. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 694.
132. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 53 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
133. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Munoz,
supra note 128, at 373-74.
134. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 593-94 (extending coercion to include "psychological
coercion"). See also id. at 632, 636-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. See Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 664 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
136. See Munoz, supra note 128, at 396-97.
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thor does not pretend that the legal alternatives suggested here are a
formula for immediate reception in the courts. But hopefully, what is
proposed will provide plausible legal routes to explore, routes which
are cognizant of and consistent with the theological implications of the
Ten Commandments.
Lael Daniel Weinberger
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